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ARTICLES
JAWS XVI:
THE EXCEPTIONS THAT ATE
RULE 220
CHARLES W. CHAPMAN*
INTRODUCTION

Do you remember the series of scenes from the first Godfather
movie? Sonny Corleone receives the call from his sister, beaten,
black-eyed and sobbing. He rushes to his car and into the trap at
the toll booth. He dies, ripped apart by machine guns. Two scenes
later Marlon Brando is at the funeral parlor. He looks at the mangled body, looks away, then speaks six words in his understated
whisper, "Look how they massacred my boy." As a member of the
Illinois Supreme Court's committee on discovery who worked on
Supreme Court Rule 220, I feel a certain kinship to Brando in that
scene. While Brando's fictional son was riddled by machine guns,
Supreme Court Rule 220 has been riddled by exceptions.
Rule 220 was promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court in
1984 to deal with the recurring problem of late disclosure of experts
and their opinions. The supreme court committee which drafted
Rule 220 found the expert provisions of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure inadequate.1 Rule 220 attempts to correct the problem
by providing more specific time limits on the disclosure of both the
expert's identity as well as the expert's opinions. Supreme Court
Rule 220 has four subsections in which it defines experts and consultants, details disclosure requirements, develops discovery provisions, and describes the limits of an expert's testimony. 2 Rather
Charles W. Chapman is the presiding judge on the Illinois Appellate
Court, 5th District. He graduated from Southern Illinois University (Edwardsville) in 1963 with a B.A. in Chemistry. He received his J.D. in 1967 from St.
Louis University Law School and his LL.M. from the Univ. of Virginia Law

School.

1. "[D]isclosure of the identity of expert witnesses shall be made to all
parties and the court in sufficient time in advance of trial so as to insure a fair
and equitable preparation of the case by all parties." 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21003(c) (1993) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1003(c) (1991)).
2. Each subsection deals with a separate aspect of the treatment of experts, and each has been the subject of treatment by the courts. See, e.g., Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Auth., 124 Ill. 2d 226, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988) (holding that
treating physicians are not Rule 220 experts); Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer,
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than examining the rule by section, however, this paper discusses
the numerous exceptions to Rule 220 disclosure requirements that
have cast doubt upon the rule's future effectiveness. Cases illustrating these exceptions will be grouped into the following
categories:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)

the treating doctor exception;
the fact (not opinion) exception;
the merely an update exception;
the further elaboration exception;
the not in anticipation of litigation exception;
the party/owner exception;
the no inquiry exception;
the opinion elicited during cross exception;
the no surprise exception;
the unusual circumstances exception;
the harmless error exception;
the general discovery disclosure exception;
the opinion formulated as part of the job exception;
the official report exception;
the previously disclosed report exception; and
the intimately involved with the subject matter of the litigation exception.
EXCEPTION No. 1:
THE TREATING DOCTOR EXCEPTION

A.

Treating Doctor Exception

The treating doctor exception is the most important exception
for two reasons. First, it is one of only two exceptions sanctioned by
the Illinois Supreme Court; 3 second, some of its language has been
used by appellate courts to allow the unwarranted late disclosure of
213 Ill. App. 3d 957, 572 N.E.2d 1169 (5th Dist. 1991)(admission of testimony of
defense expert was error where his identity not timely disclosed); Huelsmann v.
Berkowitz, 210 Ill. App. 3d 806, 568 N.E.2d 1373 (5th Dist. 1991)(interrogatory
answer did not comply with Rule 220 requiring disclosure of identity qualifications, conclusions, opinions, bases for opinions, and anticipated subject matter of
testimony); Fawcett v. Reinertson, 131 Ill. 2d
380, 580 N.E.2d 558
(1989)(party/owner exception); Hill v. Ben Franklin Savings & Loan Ass'n, 177
Ill. App. 3d 51, 531 N.E.2d 1089 (2d Dist. 1988)(plaintiff landowner not an expert
as defined in 220(a) because not retained for purpose of rendering opinion at
trial); Fogarty v. Parichy Roofing Co., 175 Ill. App. 3d 530, 529 N.E.2d 1055 (1st
Dist. 1988). See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
limits of an expert's testimony under Rule 220(d).
3. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 226, 529 N.E.2d at 525; Wilson v. Chicago Transit

Auth., 126 Ill. 2d 171, 533 N.E.2d 894 (1988).
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either identity or opinions of experts. 4 In Tzystuck v. Chicago
TransitAuthority,5 the supreme court recognized the treating doctor exception. That recognition was restated in Wilson v. Chicago
Transit Authority.6 The Tzystuck court held that treating physicians should not be considered Rule 220 experts since they are con7
sulted for treatment and not retained to render an opinion at trial.
The court further held that treating doctors may give opinions at
trial since those opinions were developed during the course of treatment and completely apart from any litigation.8 A physician's observations while treating a patient may have value as evidence at
trial, but that value is merely secondary to the treatment. The
court stated:
Although the defendants argue that "retained" in Rules 220(b)(1) and
(c) refers broadly to witnesses who are "requested" to give an opinion
within their field of expertise, we consider it obliges litigants to disclose the identity and opinions only of those witnesses who are engaged
for the purpose of giving an expert opinion at trial. It may be said that
the connection between a medical expert who is "retained to render an
opinion at trial" and the party to the suit may be litigation-related....
Treating physicians, on the other hand, typically are not "retained to
render an opinion at trial" but are consulted, whether or not litigation
is pending or contemplated, to treat a patient's physical or mental
problem. While treating physicians may give opinions at trial, those
opinions are developed in the course of treating the patient and are
completely apart from any litigation. Such an opinion is not formed in
anticipation of a trial, but is simply the product of a physician's observations while treating the patient, which coincidentally may have
value as evidence at a trial. In this respect, the opinions of treating
physicians are similar to those of occurrence witnesses who testify, not
because they were retained in the expectation they might develop and
give a particular opinion on a disputed issue at trial, but because they
witnessed or participated in the transactions or events that are part of
9
the subject matter of the litigation.
The court further indicated that the identity and opinions of treating doctors could be obtained through other discovery rules, citing

Supreme Court Rule 201(b)(1). 10

Finally, Tzystuck held that the

defendant, not the plaintiff, must pay the deposition witness fees of
4. See irnfra text accompanying notes 100-109 for a discussion of the appellate court's use of Tzystuck to justify exceptions to Rule 220.
5. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234, 529 N.E.2d at 528.
6. Wilson, 126 Ill. 2d at 176, 533 N.E.2d at 897. Illinois appellate courts
adopted the exception prior to Tzystuck and Wilson. See, e.g., Ryan v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 157 Ill. App. 3d 1069, 510 N.E.2d 1162 (1st Dist. 1987).
7. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234, 529 N.E.2d at 528.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 234-235, 529 N.E.2d at 528-529.
10. ILL. S.CT. RULE 201(b)(1) (1989) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 201
(1991)). Tzystuck also noted the potential unfairness of imposing Rule 220's
severe sanctions on a party who did not have control of a witness. Tzystuck, 124
Ill. 2d at 237, 529 N.E.2d at 530.
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a treating doctor."
When again confronted with the issue, a sharply divided Illinois
Supreme Court decided in Wilson to affirm the adoption of the
treating doctor exception. 12 Wilson involved a physician who had
last treated the plaintiff three years and seven months before the
trial. His name was listed in answers to interrogatories. The defendant objected to any opinions concerning the permanency of
plaintiff's injuries because of the length of time between the trial
and the date of the last examination. In a hearing on that objection,
the doctor volunteered that he had examined the plaintiff on the
last day of trial and had an opinion on permanency based upon that
examination. The defendant again objected, claiming surprise, and
argued that the plaintiff had violated Rule 220's disclosure requirements. The majority opinion held that the length of time between
treatment and the last examination did not change the witness from
a treating doctor to an expert witness governed by Rule 220. The
court also stated, "This type of surprise, however, must be avoided
by adequate trial preparation and not through reliance on the 'protection' of Supreme Court Rule 220."'13 Justice Miller disagreed:
Even if it is assumed that Dr. Treister remained a treating or attending
physician and therefore not subject to Supreme Court Rule 220, which
requires advance disclosure of the identities and opinions of expert witnesses I do not believe that the doctor should have been permitted to
testify about the opinion he formed from his mid-trial examination of
the plaintiff. Contrary to the majority's assertion, no amount of pretrial preparation by14defense counsel could have prevented the surprise
that occurred here.
The cases discussed above all dealt with the issue of permanency of the plaintiff's injuries. While this is obviously an important issue, it is certainly not the only one that is the subject of
expert testimony. 15 For example, in medical malpractice cases, is11. See ILL. S.CT. RULE 204(c) (1989) (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 204
(1991)). Prior to Tzystuck, the First District reached the same decision regarding treating doctors in Ryan, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 1079, 510 N.E.2d at 1168; but Cf

In re Marriage of Hartian, 172 Ill. App. 3d 440, 526 N.E.2d 1104 (1st Dist.
1988)(holding that Rule 220 applies to a treating doctor who has been identified

as an expert witness in answers to interrogatories).
12. Wilson, 126 Ill. 2d at 171, 533 N.E.2d at 894.
13. Id. at 176, 533 N.E.2d at 897.
14. Id. at 178-79, 533 N.E.2d at 898 (Miller, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).

15. Other types of experts include: Psychologists (Jesse v. Amoco Oil Co.,
230 Ill. App. 3d 337, 594 N.E.2d 1210 (1st Dist. 1992)); Chiropractors (Lowney v.
Arciom, 232 Ill. App. 3d 715, 597 N.E.2d 817 (3d Dist. 1992)); Pharmacologists
(Dixson v. University of Chicago Hosp. & Clinics, 190 Ill. App. 3d 369, 546

N.E.2d 774 (1st Dist. 1989)); Engineers (Schaffner v. Chicago & Northwestern
Transp. Co., 129 Ill. 2d 1, 541 N.E.2d 643 (1989)); Economists (Grimming v. Alton
& Southern Ry. Co., 204 Ill. App. 3d 961, 562 N.E.2d 1086 (5th Dist. 1990)); Appraisers (Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rolling Meadows, 214 Ill. App. 3d 718, 574
N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1991)).
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sues of causation and the standard of care will almost always arise,
and the question of whether a treating doctor can give an opinion on
those issues in the absence of timely disclosure has been addressed
by the appellate courts.
In a medical malpractice case, Dugan v. Weber, 16 the plaintiff's
subsequent treating doctor examined the plaintiff on the eve of trial
and was then interrogated about the extent of the plaintiff's disability as well as the defendant's deviation from the standard of care.
The defendant argued that the substance of the doctor's opinion regarding whether the defendant deviated from the applicable standard of care transformed his status from a treating physician to a
Rule 220 expert. The defendant's Rule 220 objection was overruled
and the appellate court affirmed. The court stated that Rule 220
governs only those expert witnesses whose relationship with the
plaintiff arose solely because the plaintiff retained the physician to
render an opinion at trial. The physician's relationship to the case,
not the substance of his testimony, qualifies him as a Rule 220 expert. ' 17 In contrast, the appellate court in Beaman v. Swedish
American Hospital Ass'n of Rockford,18 considered a similar issue
and approved the trial court's bar of such opinions. The court reasoned that in order to notify the defendants of the allegations
against them, the plaintiff should not be allowed to allege a theory
of liability without identifying expert testimony in advance of trial.
Beaman appears to have reached the more appropriate result
under Rule 220. However, its authority is questionable because
Tzystuck did not limit the treating doctor exception to questions of
permanency. In fact, the supreme court presented the Tzystuck issue as "whether a treating physician who will testify to a medical
opinion at trial is an expert witness within the meaning of Rule
220(b)(1)." 1 9 The supreme court held that treating doctors are not
expert witnesses within the meaning of Rule 220. Since the Tzystuck court did not define or qualify "medical opinion," the holding
encompasses more than the issue of a treating doctor's opinion testimony regarding permanency. Under Tzystuck, treating doctors
may render opinions as to permanency, standard of care, causation,
or theory of liability without being disclosed as experts under Rule
220.
The difficulty with the treating doctor exception to Rule 220 set
forth in Tzystuck first became apparent in Wilson, and is further
apparent in Dugan and Beaman. The Tzystuck rulings regarding
16. 175 Ill.
App. 3d 1088, 530 N.E.2d 1007 (1st Dist. 1988).
17. Id. at 1092, 530 N.E.2d at 1010.
18. 179 Il. App. 3d 532, 534 N.E.2d 522 (2d Dist. 1989).
19. Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Auth., 124 Ill. 2d 226, 234, 529 N.E.2d 525,
528 (1988) (emphasis added).
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deposition costs and disclosure of the identity of treating doctors are
unlikely to present any significant problems. The difficulty arises,
however, in the late disclosure of opinions that would be barred but
for the fact that the witness happened to be a treating doctor. As
Justice Miller's dissent in Wilson points out, a party cannot adequately prepare so as to avoid the introduction of a new opinion if
the treating doctor exception is taken to its logical conclusion. The
party proffering the witness gains an unfair tactical advantage if he
has no duty to supplement under Rule 220 and can furnish additional facts to the witness on the eve of trial.20 Thus, while
Beaman's bar of the late opinion appears more in line with the equitable result contemplated by Rule 220, Dugan's approval of the late
opinion is more logically consistent with the Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling in Tzystuck.
B.

Expansion of the Treating Doctor Exception

The expansion of the treating doctor exception from treatment
concerns, such as permanency, 21 to non-treatment concerns, such as
the standard of care, 22 may be appropriate since both involve opinions from treating doctors.23 It is clearly inappropriate, however, to
grant "treating doctor" status to witnesses who do not qualify in
order to absolve their opinions from Rule 220 disclosure reqiirements. An illustration of this problem is found in Beierman v.
24
Edwards.
Beierman involved a state employee who was allegedly injured
at a gas station when two cars collided. During the pendency of the
plaintiff's third-party suit, the state had the plaintiff evaluated by
Dr. Traycoff for plaintiff's worker's compensation claim. The
plaintiff eventually abandoned his third-party suit, but the state intervened and pursued it. The defendant called Dr. Traycoff over
the state's objection. The state appealed from a defense verdict and
20. This advantage would most often inure to the benefit of plaintiffs, but
cf Corrales v. American Cab Co., 170 Ill. App. 3d 907, 524 N.E.2d 923 (1st Dist.
1988) (allowing testimony of plaintiff's treating physician on behalf of defendant
notwithstanding disclosure of physician by plaintiff); Green v. Rodgers, 147 Ill.
App. 3d 1009, 498 N.E.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1986)(allowing testimony of plaintiff's
treating physician on behalf of defendants). See also Fawcett v. Reinertsen, 131
Ill. 2d 280, 546 N.E.2d 558 (1989)(holding that defendants in medical malpractice
cases do not come under Rule 220). Thus, defendant doctors are free to give
new opinions at any time.
21. Wilson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 126 Ill. 2d 171, 174, 533 N.E.2d 894, 896
(1988).
22. Beaman, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 534, 534 N.E.2d at 524; Dugan v. Weber, 175
Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1093, 530 N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (1st Dist. 1988); O'Brien v. Meyer,
196 Ill. App. 3d 457, 554 N.E.2d 257 (1st Dist. 1989).
23. See Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 226, 529 N.E.2d at 525.
24. 193 Ill. App. 3d 968, 550 N.E.2d 587 (2d Dist. 1990).
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the appellate court affirmed, 25 stating:
Rule 220 governs only those expert witnesses whose relationship with
the party arose solely because a party retained the physician to render
an opinion at trial; the physician's relationship to the case, not the substance of his testimony, qualifies him as a Rule 220 expert. Although
Dr. Traycoff did not apparently "treat" Beierman's condition his relationship with Beierman was more in the nature of26a treating physician
than a physician hired to give an opinion at trial.

The appellate court concluded that, in the context of this case, Dr.
Traycoff was either a treating physician or the state's expert. The
second basis for the opinion is clearly preferable to the first. Dr.
Traycoff was retained by the state in Beierman's worker's compensation case. The relationship between Dr. Traycoff and Beierman
was adversarial and litigation related, and it should not have been
classified as a treating doctor/patient relationship. While the
court's second basis for affirming the decision is preferable, it also
presents problems. Even though the state was aware of Dr.
Traycoff's examination of Beierman, if the state did not know that
the defendant would call Dr. Traycoff as an expert it would have no
reason to seek expert testimony on its own behalf. Therefore, the
late disclosure may have prejudiced the state. From a policy standpoint, the preferable position would be to require any party who
intends to call any expert to disclose that intention.
In 1991, the Illinois Appellate Court expressed its frustration
with the uncertainty surrounding the treating doctor exception to
27
Supreme Court Rule 220. In Phelps v. Chicago TransitAuthority,
the plaintiff received a beating on a CTA bus and recovered
$120,000.00 for his injuries. On the day of trial, the plaintiff was
examined by his treating dentist, Dr. Bruce L. Douglas. The trial
court allowed testimony from the doctor which was based upon the
late examination. The appellate court affirmed, relying upon Wilson.28 However, the court expressed its frustration as follows:
We do not condone the practice in question here. The Wilson decision
demonstrates, however, that the supreme court is well aware of the
problems caused by such undisclosed last-minute examinations. Despite this awareness, the court has not acted to amend its discovery
rules to address the situation. Perhaps this is an area which should be
25. Id. at 982, 550 N.E.2d at 597. The court could have reached its decision
on the basis that, since the state had originally contacted Dr. Traycoff through
the injured party's worker's compensation claim, it was not unfair to allow the
defendant to call Dr. Traycoff without disclosure. There may be problems even
with this reasoning. However, the Beierman court did not utilize this reasoning.
26. Id. at 977-78, 550 N.E.2d at 594 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The
italicized words, only and solely, appear nowhere in the text of Rule 220, in its
comments, or in the supreme court's Tzystuck opinion.
27. 224 Ill. App. 3d 229, 586 N.E.2d 352 (1st Dist. 1991).
28. Wilson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 126 Ill. 2d 171, 171, 533 N.E.2d 894, 894
(1988).
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29
covered by supreme court rules or appropriate legislation.

Despite such frustration, the treating doctor exception continues to
plague Rule 220.
EXCEPTION No. 2:
THE FACT (NOT OPINION) EXCEPTION
Initially, there would not appear to be much controversy over
the appropriateness of this exception. If the witness is not offering
opinions, but is merely reciting facts, then it does not matter
whether the witness happens to be an expert. For example, a person with a Ph.D in neuroanatomy who is also a board certified neurologist could be a witness to a car accident and testify regarding
what the witness observed about the paths of the cars. Clearly, this
expert need not be disclosed under Rule 220 because the witness is
merely an occurrence witness. It may seem, under these circumstances, that the fact (not opinion) exception is really no exception
at all. However, the analysis can be much more complicated.
Commentators have long recognized the difficulty in drawing a
distinction between fact and opinion:
[T]he assumption that "fact" and "opinion" stand in contrast and
hence are readily distinguishable, has proven the clumsiest of all tools
furnished the judge for regulating the examination of witnesses. It is
clumsy because its basic assumption is an illusion ....
There is no
conceivable statement, however specific, detailed and "factual," that is
not in some measure the product of inference and reflection as well as
30
observation and memory.
Thus, the line between fact and opinion is not easily drawn. Bugno
v. Mt. Sinai Hospital3 1 illustrates the problems inherent in drawing
that line. In Bugno, a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff claimed
he suffered a stroke from a deep vein thrombosis which was caused
by a tight cast. Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Miller, was cross-examined
about a treatise he had co-authored with Dr. Abramson which supported the defendant's theory that the thrombosis was caused by
physical inactivity. Dr. Miller responded that he and Dr. Abramson
had mistakenly omitted a tight cast as one of the possible causes of
32
deep vein thrombosis.
29. Phelps, 224 Ill. App. 3d at 233, 586 N.E.2d at 355.
30. Charles T. McCormick, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 11, at 23 (2d ed. 1954). See also 7 John H. Wigmore, EVIDENCE INTRI-

ALS AT COMMON LAW § 1919, at 14-17 (1978)(logical opposition between opinion
and fact). Another commentator states, "The difficulty with this exception (if it
is an exception) comes in distinguishing between 'fact' and 'opinion' testimony.
One envisions the court's manipulating the line between the two and avoiding
the sanctions of Rule 220." Charles E. Redden, The Decline of Rule 220: The
Rise of Trial By Ambush, 80 ILL. B.J. 440, 445 (1992).
31. 201 Ill. App. 3d 245, 559 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1990).
32. Id. at 253, 559 N.E.2d at 6.
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The defendant called the co-author, Dr. Abramson, who had
not been disclosed under Rule 220. Dr. Abramson was allowed to
testify that no omission was made in the treatise, but he was not
allowed to offer his opinion on the accuracy of the book. The appellate court affirmed the ruling. 33 While the ruling seems appropriate, it should be observed that Dr. Abramson could have known
that there were no omissions (the fact involved) only because of his
superior knowledge concerning the causes of thrombi.
The line on this map is indeed a fine one, and it is easy for
experts to stray across such a line, either inadvertently or deliberately. More importantly, it does not require a question beginning,
"Do you have an opinion .. .," to signal an imminent violation. For
example, both a lay person and a medical doctor could testify to
their observation of a bruise on a plaintiff's arm. Suppose that the
doctor is a pathologist who takes a biopsy of the bruise, makes tissue samples, treats them appropriately with dyes, and places them
under a microscope. The lay witness views the slide under the microscope and describes his observations as follows: "[t]here was a
glob of red stuff in the center and some green and orange squiggeldy things around the edges." The pathologist views the same
slide and states, "[t]here was an area of increased erythrocytes 120
microns in diameter in the center and an extremely decreased level
of thrombocytic activity on the edges of the field." These statements both appear to be factual in nature, both deal with personal
observations of objects that the respective witnesses saw and described, and both are equally useless.
What more is needed? Would the judge normally hear an opinion question next which would alert her to a possible Rule 220 violation? Not usually. In most cases, the next question would be,
"What do you mean?" or "Would you explain that to the jury?"
The layman would respond, "I've told you all I know." The
pathologist, however, would be perfectly capable of explaining her
answer, but that explanation is almost always going to be an opinion, whether it is explicitly stated as such or not. When the
pathologist testifies that, "the increase of erythrocytes in the center
of the field is a manifestation of the flow of red blood cells to the
area because of a rupture of intracellular membranes," she is testi34
fying as to her opinion, based upon her advanced learning.
These problems do not arise solely in the esoteric and expertladen fields of medical malpractice and product liability; they are
33. Id at 254, 559 N.E.2d at 7.
34. This hypothetical exercise in microscopic bruise viewing is included to
alert judges to what may actually be occurring in their courtrooms under the
guise of the fact (not opinion) exception. Some of these explanations may be
harmless, but they are all likely to be opinions.
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also present in the more routine world of a gas station's request to
expand to include a car wash. In Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Rolling
Meadows,35 the plaintiff called two witnesses, neither of whom had
been disclosed under Rule 220. The trial court allowed the following testimony, purportedly based on the fact (not opinion)
exception:
Q. Based on your personal observation and experience, can you tell
us, if you know, what you would have expected from this station
had it had a car wash?
[The City's Attorney]: Objection. Speculation.

***

[The Court]: I'll overrule it. She may answer.
A. I would have expected at least a 20 percent increase at this
location.
Q. Why is that?
[The City's Attorney]: Same objection, your Honor. There's no foundation. This witness is now testifying as an expert rendering an
opinion.
[The Court]: I think that if, in fact, she had stated that all other stations that have car washes increase gas volume somewhere around
20 percent, that.., meaning Mobil, that doesn't require her testimony to come under Rule 220. If she's expressing her opinion that
based on other factors that are not the business experiences of Mobil, that gas stations increase volume by 20 percent when they put
36
in car washes, I think that is a 220 expert .... She may answer.
The trial court ruled that she could testify as a fact, if she knew
it to be a fact, that all other stations with car washes increased their
gas volume twenty percent. If, however, she was testifying that it
was her opinion that including the car wash would increase volume
by twenty percent, that testimony would be prohibited. There are
two problems with that approach. First, the initial question in the
colloquy called for an opinion. Second, and more important, the
appellate court did not follow the trial court's lead, but focused instead on the source of the witness' basis as the determinant of expert status.
The opinion states:
The trial court properly determined that [the witness] would not be
testifying as an expert because his testimony related to knowledge he
personally learned as a consequence of supervising the mini-mart construction. Personal knowledge with respect to a matter is not sufficient to render an individual an "expert." Therefore, Mobil
did not
37
have to comply with Rule 220 of the supreme court rules.
35. 214 Ill. App. 3d 718, 574 N.E.2d 41 (1st Dist. 1991).
36. Id. at 722-23, 574 N.E.2d at 45.
37. Id. at 727, 574 N.E.2d at 48.
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The opinion further states, "She merely testified as to matters she
personally knew as a consequence of her employment with Mobil."'38 Thus, the Mobil Oil case establishes a new twist to the fact
(not opinion) exception by-making distinctions based on the source
of the witness' knowledge. This is not a valid exception. An expert
may be an expert either because of formal academic training or because of on-the-job experience. 39 The source of the expertise does
40
not affect the witness' status as an expert.
A similar situation arose in Pharrv. Chicago Transit Authority.4 1 In Pharr,the plaintiff was allegedly caught in a bus door
upon leaving a bus. The bus pulled out, dragging the plaintiff. The
bus driver testified for the defendant, over objection, that the bus
was equipped with an interlocking system. He also testified that
the interlocking system prevented the bus from moving if the rear
doors were open. The appellate court affirmed, and analogized the
bus driver's testimony to a lay person testifying about his automobile's equipment. 42 This analogy may apply to the bus driver's testimony as to the type of equipment on the bus; however, it is
questionable whether testimony regarding the actual functioning of
the safety device remains within the realm of factual testimony.
Allowing the testimony as factual certainly stretches the line between 'fact' and 'opinion.'
43
A classic case of line stretching appears in Atkins v. Thapedi,
a medical malpractice case arising out of defendant's treatment of
the plaintiff's lower back injury. While the basis for the appellate
court's approval of the testimony of an undisclosed orthopedist is
not completely clear, the bulk of the opinion deals with the fact
38. Id.
39. See Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 163, 349 N.E.2d
578, 586 (1st Dist. 1976) (finding tire mechanic with 18 years of experience qualified to give an expert opinion); Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 844,
849, 265 N.E.2d 212, 215 (5th Dist. 1970) (stating that witness with extensive
knowledge of automobiles qualifies as an expert, although lacking specific experience with the automobile at issue).
40. Nowakowski, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 163, 349 N.E.2d at 586. Assume that a
locomotive engineer is called as a witness in a railroad crossing accident case
and that his testimony will be to the effect that it would take a half-mile to stop
a 60-car train comprised of hopper cars, half of which are loaded and half of
which are unloaded, that is traveling on a level track at 30 miles per hour.
Could the witness testify that he had been an engineer on such a train and
brought it to a stop under these circumstances? Assuming there are no other
evidentiary problems, the answer to that question should be "yes;" it is something he has done and therefore, "he personally knew as a consequence of his
employment ...." But, if he is asked, "In your opinion can such and such a
train be stopped," the fact that his ability to give that opinion is based on the
knowledge that he gained through his personal experience does not change its
status as an opinion.
41. 220 Ill. App. 3d 509, 581 N.E.2d'162 (1st Dist. 1991).
42. Id. at 518, 581 N.E.2d at 168.
43. 166 Ill. App. 3d 471, 519 N.E.2d 1073 (1st Dist. 1988).
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(not opinion) exception. Plaintiff's testifying expert, Dr. Sussman,
testified by evidence deposition, and one of his criticisms of the defendant was that another treating doctor, Dr. Sheinkop, had recommended surgery. In order to contradict Dr. Sussman's testimony,
the defendant called Dr. Sheinkop to establish his diagnosis of the
plaintiff's condition and to establish the fact that he had not recommended surgery while the plaintiff was under his care. Even with
the factual statement, "I did not recommend surgery," the difficulty
with the fact (not opinion) exception is present, if not immediately
obvious. What is implicit in that statement? "Because, in my opinion, surgery was not the proper course of treatment."44 The appellate court stated that the main thrust of Dr. Sheinkop's brief
testimony was a recitation of factual statements made by Dr. Suss45
man and that any error was harmless.
While there may have been reasons in Atkins that justify the
ultimate result, the fact (not opinion) exception does not appear to
be one of them. Although the result in Atkins is not necessarily
wrong, the method chosen to reach that result suggests to lawyers
that courts are manipulating the line between fact and opinion and
avoiding the sanctions of Rule 220.46
EXCEPTION No. 3:
THE MERELY AN UPDATE EXCEPTION

The problems inherent in the merely an update exception are
44. To make the problem even more glaring, consider some of the questions
put to Dr. Sheinkop in his factual capacity:
Q. The organic part of his back pain, were you able to determine with a

reasonable degree of medical, surgical certainty as to whether his back
pain was caused in any part by the condition of his disk at L-4, 5 level?

Q. Were you able to arrive at a conclusion, based upon a reasonable de-

gree of medical and surgical certainty as to whether any abnormality of
the 1-4 -

excuse me, L-5 as one disk contributed to his problems?

Q. Based upon this information that the back brace did not relieve his
symptoms, were you able to arrive at a conclusion based upon the reasonable degree of medical and surgical certainty as to whether Mr. Atkins had instability of the spine?
Q. Dr. Sheinkop, did you, based upon your-based upon the history, physical examination, CT scan, the myelogram, were you able to arrive at a
decision as to whether this patient's condition based upon a reasonable
degree of medical and surgical certainty as to whether this patient had
a herniated disk at the L-4, 5 level that was compressing upon the
nerve root?
Id. at 476, 519 N.E.2d at 1076.
45. Id. at 476, 519 N.E.2d at 1077.
46. Redden, supra note 30, at 445.
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illustrated in Singh v. Air Illinois.47 In Singh, a wrongful death
case, the plaintiff's economist updated his report on the decedent's
earning capacity just prior to trial. The court acknowledged that
Rule 220(c)(3) requires automatic supplementation of experts' opinions.48 The court quoted the committee comments on this point,
stating, "In order to prevent an undisclosed shift in theory or belief,
the rule requires that a party seasonably submit a modified report
or supplemental answers taking into account shifts in the expert's
views."'49 The court held, however, that there was no error because
the new report was "merely an update of the original.. ." and did
50
not involve a "shift in theory or belief."
The court may have been correct in its conclusion that there
was no shift in theory, since the same methodology was apparently
used. The validity of the second part of its conclusion that there
was no shift "in belief," however, may be debatable. Since the court
did not indicate the substantive difference between the opinion at
trial and the opinion before trial, it is difficult to comment upon the
result. If, however, the "updating" changed or shifted the expert's
belief from an opinion that the present cash value of decedent's
earning capacity was $500,000 to a belief that the same present cash
value was $1,000,000, the potential prejudice to the defendant becomes readily apparent.
The committee comments do not refer merely to a shift in theory, they refer to a shift in theory or belief. The rule itself requires
automatic supplementation. There was a lack of compliance in
Singh, and the court created the merely an update exception to excuse it. The result may have been warranted, but the rationale for
51
it is not supported by either the rule or its comments.
EXCEPTION No. 4:
THE FURTHER ELABORATION EXCEPTION

McGuckin v. Chicago Union Station,5 2 clearly illustrates how
the further elaboration exception can riddle Rule 220. In McGuckin, an expert was allowed to change his opinion in a wrongful
47. 165 Ill. App. 3d 923, 520 N.E.2d 852 (1st Dist. 1988).
48. "A party shall be required to seasonably supplement his answers to interrogatories propounded under this rule as additional information becomes
known to the party or his counsel." ILL. S.CT. RULE 220(c)(3) (1984) (ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220(c)(3) (1991)).
49. Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220 (Smith-Hurd
1984).
50. Singh, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 930, 520 N.E.2d at 856.
51. See Stringham v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 181 Ill. App. 3d 312, 321, 536
N.E.2d 1292, 1298 (2d Dist. 1989).
52. 191 Ill. App. 3d 982, 548 N.E.2d 461 (1st Dist. 1989).
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death claim arising out of a fire. 53 During his deposition, the expert
stated that "he could not render an opinion [as to the cause of the
fire] with any degree of certainty." 5' 4 At trial, however, the expert
testified that the fire probably resulted from a cigarette or hot ashes
in the trash carts. 55 The trial court allowed the testimony and the
appellate court affirmed, stating:
We do not find the [deposition testimony and the trial testimony] inconsistent. The trial testimony... is a further elaboration on his deposition testimony. The same trial testimony could have been elicited at
the deposition if the attorney had asked [the witness] to be more specific or to list the various possibilities and their corresponding
probabilities. Even assuming that the testimonies
differed, we are not
56
persuaded that Union Station was prejudiced.
The ruling in McGuckin is not only wrong, but also would allow the
elaboration exception to swallow the rule. If going from no opinion
with any degree of certainty to a high probability of a specific cause
is not inconsistent, then the scope of the testimony restriction of
Rule 220(d) is meaningless.
EXCEPTION No. 5:
THE NOT IN ANTICIPATION OF LITIGATION EXCEPTION

This exception was used in Cleveland Wrecking Company v.

Central National Bank.57 Cleveland Wrecking was a subcontractor
on a demolition job. During a strike, and while Cleveland Wrecking
was not on the job site, the owners had their workers sever a wall.
When Cleveland Wrecking learned of this action, it hired a structural engineer named Larry Reiss to investigate. During the pendency of the lawsuit, Reiss was never disclosed as an expert.
Nonetheless, he was allowed to testify to certain opinions about the
wall during rebuttal. The appellate court likened Reiss to a treat58
ing doctor and found no error in his testimony.
Rule 220(b)(1) requires parties to disclose "the identity of an
expert who is retained to render an opinion at trial .... 59 The
53. Two undisclosed experts were also allowed to testify, but the rulings on

those witnesses are not the subject of this exception. Id. at 1000, 548 N.E.2d at
473.
54. Id. He stated that there were a number of possibilities, with varying
degrees of probability. Id. at 1001, 548 N.E.2d at 474.
55. Id.
56. McGuckin, 191 Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 548 N.E.2d at 474.
57. 216 Ill. App. 3d 279, 576 N.E.2d 1055 (1st Dist. 1991).
58. "Even though litigation was unavoidable at the time Reiss rendered his

opinion, he was not specifically called in anticipation of litigation. Therefore,
he was not an expert witness whose identity was required to be revealed before
trial pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 220." Id. at 295, 576 N.E.2d at 1067 (em-

phasis added).
59. ILL. S.CT. RULE 220 (b)(1) (1984) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220

(b)(1)(1991)).
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supreme court relied upon this language in the rule to formulate
the Tzystuck treating doctor exception, 60 but that language does not
justify the decision in Cleveland Wrecking. The court acknowledged that "litigation was unavoidable at the time [the expert] rendered his opinion. 61 The court ruled, however, that since "[the
expert] was not specifially called in anticipation of litigation," he
was not an expert witness subject to Rule 220.62 The Ceveland
Wrecking court judicially inserted the word "specifically" before
the word "retained" in 220 (b)(1). Under this construction, if any
reason for the retention of an expert exists, in addition to his testimony at trial, then he has not been "specifically retained" and is not
subject to disclosure under Rule 220. The rule does not allow this,
the supreme court has not sanctioned it, and hopefully this excep63
tion will be limited to the Cleveland Wrecking facts.
EXCEPTION No. 6:
THE PARTY/OWNER EXCEPTION

Unlike the preceding exception, which was created by the appellate court, the party/owner exception is, at least partially, the
creation of the supreme court. In Fawcett v. Reinertsen,6 a medical
malpractice case, the defendants were held in contempt of court for
refusing to answer deposition questions regarding the standard of
care. The defendants based their refusal on the fact that the plaintiffs had not designated them as experts under Rule 220.65 The
supreme court held that they could be compelled to answer those
questions.
Fawcett relied upon Tzystuck and its treatment-related rather
than litigation-related distinction to determine that a defendant
physician was not an expert within the disclosure provisions of Rule
220. The use of this distinction is not surprising since the defendants in Fawcett were clearly treating doctors and would, therefore,
come under the Tzystuck umbrella.6 The court held that the general discovery provisions, rather than Rule 220, would apply to de60. See supra notes 3-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the treating doctor exception.
61. Cleveland Wrecking, 216 Ill. App. 3d at 295, 576 N.E.2d at 1067.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. See also Forest Preserve Dist. v. Brookwood Land Venture, 199 Ill. App.
3d 973, 981, 557 N.E.2d 980, 987 (2d Dist. 1990)(expert witness who had direct
involvement in subject matter of litigation need not comply with Rule 220 because testimony was not prepared in anticipation of trial). See infra notes 100126 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "intimately involved in the
subject matter of the litigation" exception.
64. 131 Ill. 2d 380, 546 N.E.2d 558 (1989).
65. Id. at 383, 546 N.E.2d at 559.
66. Id. It may be noteworthy that the supreme court did not discuss control
versus lack of control in deciding Fawcett. Id.
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fendant physicians.6 7
The party exception for defendant doctors has been extended
to other parties. In Hill v. Ben Franklin Savings & Loan Association,68 the plaintiff owner was not allowed to testify as to the value
of his property. The appellate court reversed, relying upon Tzystuck. 6 9 The court stated:
[W]e conclude that a party to a suit cannot be said to be retained to
render an opinion at trial. A party is not engaged for the purpose of
giving expert opinion at trial, but rather is a participant in the transac-

tion that is the subject matter of the litigation. A party is subject, however, to the expert witness discovery provision of Rule 220(c)(4) which
gives an70opposing party the opportunity to discover a party's expert
opinion.
Hill has extended the defendant-doctor exception that was created
by the supreme court in Fawcett to include all parties. However,
Hill, unlike Fawcett, held that while the disclosure requirements of
Rule 220(b) do not apply to party-experts, the discovery require71
ments of Rule 220(c) do apply.
The move from the defendant-treating doctor exception to the
party/owner exception was extended again in Departmentof Transportation ex rel. People v. CentralStone Company,72 an eminent domain proceeding. The Central Stone court approved the nondisclosure of the president and shareholder of a party, who had a
degree in mining engineering and who testified as to the value of
the property owned by his employer. The court first characterized
the witness as a non-expert who was giving lay witness opinion testimony. On this point, it should be noted that the witness in Central Stone was not the owner, but the president. The court then
ruled that even if the president was an expert, his non-disclosure
73
was allowed under Tzystuck and Hill.
67. Id. at 385, 546 N.E.2d at 560.
68. 177 Ill. App. 3d 51, 531 N.E.2d 1089, (2d Dist. 1989).
69. Id. at 58, 531 N.E.2d at 1094 (citing Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 234-35, 529
N.E.2d at 528-29).
70. Id. Rule 220(c)(4) states:
The provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) hereof also apply to a party or an
employee of a party who will render an opinion within his expertise at the
time of trial. However, the provisions of paragraphs (c) and (d) do not apply
to parties or employees of entities whose professional acts or omissions are
the subject of the litigation. The opinions of these latter persons may be the
subject of disclosure by deposition only.
ILL. S.CT. RULE 220(c)(4) (1984)(ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 204 (1991)).
71. Hill, 171 Ill. App. 3d at 58, 531 N.E.2d at 1093. See also Karr v. Noel, 212
Ill. App. 3d 575, 583, 571 N.E.2d 271, 276 (5th Dist. 1991)(noting that even treating doctors should not be allowed to extend their opinions beyond the scope of
their deposition testimony).
72. 200 Ill. App. 3d 841, 558 N.E.2d 742, (4th Dist. 1990).
73. Id. at 852-53, 558 N.E.2d at 750.
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With all due respect to the fourth district, the Central Stone
case is far removed from either Tzystuck or Hill. The president of
Central Stone was not a treating doctor and he was neither a party
nor an owner. He was an engineer-employee of an owner. Central
Stone comes perilously close to extending the party/owner exception to all experts who happen to own shares of the companies that
74
employ them.
EXCEPTION NO. 7:
THE No INQUIRY EXCEPTION

This exception, unlike some of the others which have been discussed, has some basis in the language of Rule 220. Subsection (d)
provides that experts shall not go beyond their pre-trial disclosure
but it concludes, "[h]owever, [the expert] shall not be prevented
from testifying as to facts or opinions on matters regarding which
inquiry was not made in the discovery proceedings.175 As the committee comments point out, however, "[t]his latter qualification will
have only limited application in light of the requirement that a
party continuously supplement discovery concerning the opinions
76
of such witnesses."
Notwithstanding the emphasis on full disclosure that pervades
Rule 220 and the quoted committee comments, the court in Fogarty
v. Parichy Roofing Company.77 affirmed a major change in opinion
based on a no inquiry exception. In Fogarty,the defendant's expert
witness, Dr. Smith, had given a deposition one and a half years
before trial in which he limited his opinions to his orthopedic findings based upon his physical examination of the plaintiff. At trial,
however, he began to testify about his neurological findings. The
trial court recessed the proceedings and allowed plaintiff's counsel
to depose Dr. Smith again. In this second deposition, the witness
stated that he had not been asked to render the neurological opinions until the third day of trial. After the second deposition, defense counsel showed Dr. Smith the plaintiff's medical records, and
when he took the stand again, he testified that the plaintiff's spinal
cyst was pre-existing and had not been caused by the accident. On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court should not have allowed the doctor to testify about this undisclosed opinion. The appellate court affirmed, based upon the last sentence of Rule
74. The control/lack of control basis of Tzystuck would not have supported
the non-disclosure of the expert in Central Stone.
75.

ILL.

S.CT. RULE

220(d)

(1984)

(ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 110A,

para.

220(d)(1991)) (emphasis added).
76. Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220(d) (SmithHurd 1984).
77. 175 Ill. App. 3d 530, 541, 529 N.E.2d 1055, 1063 (1st Dist. 1988).
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220(d). 78 The court further justified its rulings by noting that the
plaintiff's attorney had been given a second opportunity during
trial to depose defendant's expert on the new neurological opinions,
and the plaintiff's attorney had not inquired about any pre-existing
79
causes at the second deposition.
Both of these reasons are subject to criticism. As to the first,
requiring a party to take the deposition of an expert during trial is
one of the evils which Rule 220 was promulgated to eliminate. As
to the second, inquiry by plaintiff's counsel about the witness'
knowledge of a pre-existing condition would have revealed nothing
since defense counsel carefully chose not to show plaintiff's medical
records to the expert until after the second deposition had been
completed. Nevertheless, the court held that no violation of Rule
220 had occurred under these circumstances.
Swaw v. Klompien80 is similar to Fogarty in its reliance on the
last sentence of Rule 220(d), but different in its factual background.
In Swaw, it was plaintiff's counsel who successfully introduced new
opinions on the extent and permanency of the plaintiff's injuries.
The appellate court held that these opinions were not developed
during the course of the deposition of the expert. In Swaw, there is
no indication of the type of gamesmanship employed by counsel in
Fogarty. Even without the gamesmanship, however, the result is
questionable because Rule 220 requires counsel to seasonably supplement prior discovery to make any new opinions known to opposing counsel. Therefore, even in the absence of inquiry by defense
counsel, the plaintiff's lawyer should have supplemented the prior
testimony with the new opinions. Swaw does not indicate when
plaintiff's counsel learned of the new opinions, but Rule 220 contemplates the disclosure and discovery of all opinions sixty days
before the reasonably anticipated trial date.
The expert's change of opinion in Northern Trust Company v.
St. Francis Hospital8 l revolved around the plaintiff's chances of
survival. Defendant's witness, Dr. Rosenberg, testified at his depo78. Id. The court stated:
[T]he rule provides that the testimony of an expert at trial may not be inconsistent with nor go beyond the fair scope of facts known or opinions
disclosed in the discovery proceedings. However, the rule further provides
that an expert "shall not be prevented from testifying as to facts or opinions on matters regarding which inquiry was not made in the discovery
proceedings."

Id.
79. Id.
80. 168 Ill. App. 3d 705, 715, 522 N.E.2d 1267, 1073 (1st Dist. 1988)(holding
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it permitted an expert to
testify as to an opinion which was well within the scope of discovery, even when
no inquiry concerning that opinion was made during the deposition).

81. 168 Ill. App. 3d 270, 522 N.E.2d 699, (1st Dist. 1988).
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sition that if plaintiff had been admitted to the hospital on his first
visit at 1:30 a.m., he would have had a fifty-to-sixty percent chance
of survival. At trial he testified that the decedent's chances of survival were only ten to fifteen percent when he was finally admitted
at 6:30 a.m. The appellate court found no error and characterized
these differences as "two separate opinions based on two separate
82
scenarios."
Even if the Northern Trust holding is simply a recognition that
a change in the facts presented to an expert may easily cause a
change in his opinion, its result is still troublesome under Rule 220.
The rule is intended to forcefully encourage early and complete disclosure of all opinions. The proponent of the evidence has the burden to disclose, since he is most knowledgeable about the opinions
supporting his theory of the case and the facts necessary to establish a basis for those opinions.
EXCEPTION No. 8:
THE OPINION ELICITED DURING CROSS EXCEPTION

In Kokotkwiecz v. Leprino Foods Company,83 the plaintiff was
examined at the defendant's request by Dr. Ross. The plaintiff
called Dr. Ross in her case in chief. Dr. Ross testified that it was
possible that the plaintiff had a herniated disk prior to the occurrence alleged in the complaint. During cross-examination, defense
counsel presented Dr. Ross with some additional medical records,
and based upon these records, he testified that the plaintiff did, in
fact, have a herniated disk prior to the alleged occurrence. The
plaintiff's objection to the new opinion was overruled and the appellate court affirmed, stating:
Dr. Ross was plaintiff's witness, and as such, the doctor's testimony
had to be accepted by plaintiff. In effect, by calling Dr. Ross as her
own witness, plaintiff exempted defendant from complying with Rule
220(d). Since defendant had no plans to call Dr. Ross, defendant had
no need to supplement the doctor's opinion. Had it planned to call the
doctor as its expert, it would have been required to give plaintiff notice
of any changes or additional bases for the doctor's opinions. It was not
error under these circumstances for defendant
to use additional mate84
rial to firm up the doctor's previous opinion.
While the Kokotkwiecz holding is fair standing alone, if combined with the appellate court's opinion in Lebrecht v. Tuli,8 5 holding that co-defendants can cross-examine each other's experts even
though no adverse relationship exists, the potential for abuse is apparent. In any case where there is more than one party on either
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id.
162 Ill. App. 3d 493, 515 N.E.2d 395 (4th Dist. 1987).
Id. at 499, 515 N.E.2d at 399.
130 Ill. App. 3d 457, 473 N.E.2d 1322 (4th Dist. 1985).

The John Marshall Law Review

[V7ol. 26:189

side, it can certainly be argued that any new opinion elicited on
cross-examination does not come within the purview of Rule 220,
thus thwarting the rule's purpose.
EXCEPTION No. 9:
THE No SURPRISE EXCEPTION

Compare Mazzone v. Holmes8 6 and Renfro v. Allied Industrial
87
Equipment Corporation
with Coleman v. Central fllinois Public
8
8
Service Company. In Mazzone and Renfro, the Illinois Appellate
Court held that it was inappropriate to allow a party to call an adverse party's expert witness when no Rule 220 disclosure had been
made.8 9 However, the appellate court reached the opposite result
in Coleman, stating in dicta that no disclosure was necessary where
there was no surprise to the opponent. 90 The first matter of concern with the Coleman opinion is that it admittedly addresses a
Rule 220 issue it need not have addressed. The second matter of
concern is that, through dicta, the Coleman opinion specifically created an additional exception of no surprise in addressing the Rule
220 issue.9 1

The no surprise exception of Coleman is a little like a modification of the child's game of kick-the-can which is itself a modification
of hide-and-seek. Under the regular rules of kick-the-can, the person who is "It" stands on a can and counts to 100 while the other
86. 197 Ill. App. 3d 886, 901, 557 N.E.2d 186, 195 (1st Dist. 1990)(stating that
because plaintiff failed to meet the Rule 220 notice requirements, the trial court
was correct in barring testimony of plaintiff's expert).

87. 155 Ill. App. 3d 140, 507 N.E.2d 1213 (5th Dist. 1987).
88. 207 Ill. App. 3d 96, 103, 565 N.E.2d 274, 278 (4th Dist. 1990)(noting that
the only "surprise" to the plaintiff was that the witness was asked to give an
expert opinion).
89. Mazzone, 197 Ill. App. 3d at 901, 557 N.E.2d at 195; Renfro, 155 Ill. App.
3d at 163, 507 N.E.2d at 1231.
90. Coleman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 565 N.E.2d at 278.
The Coleman court indicated that the circumstances of the case were unusual. Id. at 103, 565 N.E.2d at 279. The witness in Coleman was a chemist employed by the defendant. The defendant presented the witness to testify
regarding the type of chemical present in barrels near where the plaintiff was
injured. Plaintiff's claim was based on the slipperiness of the chemical. After
some maneuvering, the plaintiff asked leave to call the chemist in rebuttal. The
trial court denied the request and the plaintiff lost. On appeal, the appellate
court held that the denial of the request was proper, noted that it did not need
to address the Rule 220 question, and then proceeded to answer it. Id. at 101, 565
N.E.2d at 277.
In dicta, the court examined the possibility of approving non-disclosure
under its interpretation of Tzystuck as an occurrence witness exception case,
but rejected that approach. Next, the court examined and rejected the possibility of approving non-disclosure under the intimately involved in the subject
matter of the litigation exception. Id. (discussing Smith v. Central Ill. Pub. Ser.
Co., 176 Ill. App. 3d 482, 494, 531 N.E.2d 51, 59 (4th Dist. 1988)).
91. Coleman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 565 N.E.2d at 279.
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players hide. The person who is "It" then looks for the hidden players and when he finds one, they race back to the can. If the person
who is "It" wins the race, the other person is captured. The captured children are freed only if one of the other hidden children
beats the person who is "It" back to the can and kicks it. The sound
of a can rolling end-over-end down the street used to signal freedom
for captured kids on hot summer nights.
Why this sojourn into childhood games? Well, there is no surprise about what the hidden children want to do. Generally, the
slower ones remained hidden while the faster and more adventuresome ones made the run to kick the can and gain the glory of the
night. Suppose, however, that the person who was "It" made a deal
with the fastest runner of the group; say a payment of a Stan Musial card, a Mickey Mantle card, and one-half a king sized Royal
Crown Cola was promised in exchange for the fastest runner not to
free the captives. Note that the person who is "It" knows the identity of the fastest runner, and he also knows what he can do; he can
beat him in the race to kick the can, but because of his arrangement
the person who is "It" expects him not to do what he can do. Would
anyone seriously contend that the person who is "It" is not surprised when the speedster shows up as the champion of the
captives?
Similarly, a party to a lawsuit would be surprised by seeing its
expert appearing on the other side and utilizing his skills on behalf
of the opponent. The fact that the identity and the opinion are not
surprises does not mean that the appearance on the other side is
not. Baseball cards and R.C. Colas do not bind the fastest runner to
the person who is "It" forever, but they ought to at least entitle him
to a warning. The hundreds of thousands of dollars that experts
receive should entitle a party to the assurance that the expert is not
going to be testifying for the other side, at least not without a timely
disclosure of that fact pursuant to Rule 220.92
EXCEPTION No. 10:
THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION

The title of this exception suggests that the number of cases
utilizing it should be few. In Engel v. Chicago & Northwestern
Transportation Company,9 3 plaintiff called a forensic documents
examiner during trial with no prior disclosure. Although this procedure did not comply with Rule 220, the trial court allowed the
92. See Fischer v. G & S Builders, 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 172, 497 N.E.2d 1022,
1025 (3d Dist. 1986)(plaintiff's expert barred from testifying where identity not
disclosed until three days before trial, even though defendants were aware that
he had inspected the premises).
93. 186 Ill. App. 3d 522, 542 N.E.2d 729 (1st Dist. 1989).
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witness' testimony, and the appellate court affirmed. The reader is
wisely thinking, "there must have been unusual circumstances in
this case." There were. The court allowed plaintiff's documents
expert because the defendants had not produced the originals of the
challenged documents until trial. Engel presents a truly unusual
94
circumstance that warrants the late disclosure of an expert.
Another case which approved a late disclosure because of unusual circumstances is Marshall v. Osborn.95 In Marshall, the trial
court allowed the testimony of an undisclosed intoxication expert
because, after the close of plaintiff's case in chief, the court reversed its in limine order barring intoxication evidence. However,
the court warned, "[w]e caution counsel in future cases ... that the
better practice is to disclose all potential expert witnesses since the
decision to bar an undisclosed witness rests with the trial judge." 96
EXCEPTION No. 11:
THE HARMLESS ERROR EXCEPTION

The term "harmless error" has been characterized as a device
appellate courts use to affirm cases when no other reason can be
found. The discussion of this exception does not discuss that characterization. However, it is true that the cases illustrating this exception have little precedential value. 97 After all, the disclosures
involved have been characterized as error, albeit harmless. Therefore, it is unlikely that future litigants will use them to urge courts
to approve conduct which courts have previously condemned. Because of the lack of precedential value of cases utilizing this exception, it is considered less harmful to the efficacy of Rule 220 than
many of the others.
94. See also Coleman, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 103, 565 N.E.2d at 279 (noting that
"[flairness required that under the very unusual situation here, notice pursuant
to Rule 220 should not be a condition precedent to calling a witness...

95. 213 Ill. App. 3d 134, 571 N.E.2d 492 (3d Dist. 1991).
96. Id. at 142, 571 N.E.2d at 498 (emphasis added).
97. For a discussion of instances in which the application of Rule 220 results
in harmless error see Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Soffer, 213 Ill. App. 3d 957, 979,
572 N.E.2d 1169, 1185 (5th Dist. 1991); Ryback v. Provenzale, 181 Ill. App. 3d 884,
897, 537 N.E.2d 1321, 1329 (2d Dist. 1989); McDonald's Corp. v Butler Co., 158 Ill.

App. 3d 902, 911, 511 N.E.2d 912, 919 (2d Dist. 1987).
Some of the harmless error cases also discuss waiver. While waiver is not
included in this discussion, as it is not a true exception, some cases have been
resolved at least partially on a waiver basis. See, e.g., Kosinski v. Inland Steel
Co., 192 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1026, 549 N.E.2d 784, 790 (1st Dist. 1989); Oakleaf of
Illinois v. Oakleaf & Associates, Inc., 173 Ill. App. 3d 637, 651, 527 N.E.2d 926,
935 (1st Dist. 1988).
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EXCEPTION No. 12:
THE GENERAL DISCOVERY DISCLOSURE EXCEPTION
EXCEPTION No. 13:
THE OPINION FORMULATED AS PART OF THE JOB
EXCEPTION
EXCEPTION No. 14:
THE OFFICIAL REPORT EXCEPTION
EXCEPTION No. 15:
THE PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED REPORT EXCEPTION

These four exceptions are grouped together for discussion because any or all of them may be the basis for the decision in DeYoung v. Alpha Construction Company,9 8 a wrongful death case
arising out of a gas explosion. The expert in DeYoung was a fire
marshal who was allowed to express an opinion on behalf of the
plaintiff regarding the origin of the explosion even though he had
not been disclosed under Rule 220. The defendant appealed. On
appeal, the plaintiff argued:
1) both parties disclosed the witness' name in general discovery responses;
2) the fire marshal's opinion was formulated as part of his job
duties;
3) the fire marshal's opinion was contained in his official report; and
4) the trial testimony was based on a previously disclosed
report.
The portion of the opinion which discusses Rule 220 is short; it
lists the plaintiff's arguments, cites Tzystuck, states that the defendant could not have been surprised since it had the expert's report well in advance of trial, and affirms. There are two problems
with DeYoung. First, the fact that the identity of an expert and the
existence of his report are known from outside sources does not
mean that the proponent of the expert has complied with Rule
220. 99 The rule does not say, "disclose the identity of your expert
unless your opponent may know about him from some other
source." The rule says disclose the identity. 'The rule quite obviously does not include any of the other exceptions created and relied upon in DeYoung.
98. 186 Ill. App. 3d 758, 767, 542 N.E.2d 859, 865 (1st Dist. 1989)(holding that
because the fire marshal was not "engaged for the purpose of giving an expert
opinion at trial," plaintiffs were not required to disclose his opinion under Rule
220).
99. See Fischer v. G & S Builders, 147 Ill. App. 3d 168, 497 N.E.2d 1022 (3d
Dist. 1986).
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Second, trial lawyers are entitled to plan their preparation and
presentation in reliance upon rules meaning what they say. Since
analogies from the movies and childhood have already been used,
one from sports might be in order.
The National Basketball Association allows five players per
side to participate at any one time, and it requires the ball to be shot
from in-bounds in order for the score to count. Now everyone, that
is both sides in this context, knows the identity of the additional
experts on these teams that sit along the side lines waiting to be
called into the game. Everyone knows the degree of skill they
possess.
What would happen if a sixth person rose from the bench and
started popping three pointers from the sideline, but from out-ofbounds, just helping his five teammates on the floor? "The officials
might ask the team doctor to take a look at him," you say? But
wait, the officials say that these points count! "How can this be,"
you ask. "It's simple," the officials explain, "those rules about five
players and being in-bounds do not apply in this case; see
DeYoung."
What does DeYoung have to offer?
No. 12. Both sides knew the player's identity.
No. 13. He developed his opinion (skills) as a part of his job
duties.
No. 14. There's an official report on his skills.
No. 15. His performance in the game mirrored the previously
disclosed report.
If, in all seriousness, it is inconceivable that an official from the
NBA would make such a ruling, one might ask, why do we view the
rules that govern a game more seriously that we do those that govern the courts?
EXCEPTION No. 16:
THE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT MATTER
OF THE LITIGATION EXCEPTION

If Tzystuck is the supreme court case which began the exceptions to Rule 220, Smith v. Central Illinois Public Service Companyl°° occupies the point of origin for many of the appellate court
exceptions. In Smith, the defendant's employee, an engineer, was
allowed to testify regarding his opinion that a "galley system was
designed in the safest manner and complied with all professional
100. 176 Ill. App. 3d 482, 531 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1988)(holding, inter alia,
that an employee of a party to the litigation does not have to be disclosed as an
expert witness if the employee is "intimately involved in the subject matter of
[that] litigation").
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standards." 10 1 Although the plaintiff had taken the engineer's deposition, he argued that since the engineer had not been disclosed as
an expert, he had not been questioned in the area of his expertise.
The court likened the Smith situation to the treating doctor situation in Tzystuck, and held:
These rationales apply in the instant case. [The employee] was clearly
known as an engineer to plaintiff long before trial because he was the
project manager ... [at the time the) plaintiff was injured. Thus, the
fact that he testified is not a surprise, rather that he gave an expert
opinion surprised [the] plaintiff. Also, [the employee] was not re-

tained as an expert for litigation. Rather, he was testifying because he
was intimately involved in the project as an occurrence witness, long
before any litigation was even contemplated. Therefore, we hold that a
party, or an employee of a party, who is intimately involved in the
subject matter of the litigation need
not be disclosed as an expert wit1
ness pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1). 02

The Smith court examined two rationales used by the Tzystuck
court. The first Tzystuck rationale mentioned in Smith is that the
doctor obtains the bases for his opinion by giving aid to the patient
and not in preparation for litigation. The second is that a treating
doctor's activity is discoverable under the general discovery provi10 3
sions, and consequently, possesses little threat of surprise.
While both of these statements appear in Tzystuck, it is submitted that neither of them was of prime importance in the supreme
court's decision. The source of the expert's bases is important only
in determining whether the witness was retained under Rule 220.
The chance of surprise with regard to treating doctors is lessened
because (a) their names will be routinely disclosed, and (b) they are
obviously capable of rendering important opinions. This rationale,
however, would apply to every expert whose disclosure was required by the predecessor of Rule 220. If the supreme court had
meant to require parties to rely on the general discovery provisions
to deal with experts, it need not have promulgated Rule 220. It is
submitted that a rationale not mentioned by the Smith court is the
primary basis for the Tzystuck opinion.
Our conclusion that treating physicians are not expert witnesses
within the meaning of Rule 220 is logical in light of discovery obligations which Rule 220(c) imposes upon parties. Subsection (c) obligates
the party "retaining or employing" an expert witness to respond to interrogatories regarding the subject matter of the expert's testimony,
the expert's conclusions, opinions and the bases thereof, and the expert's qualifications. The party retaining the expert must also continuously keep in touch with the witness in regard to his opinion and advise
opposing parties of any changes in the opinion by seasonably supplementing answers to interrogatories propounded under the rule. An ex101. Id. at 493, 531 N.E.2d at 58.
102. Id. at 494-95, 531 N.E.2d at 59 (emphasis added).
103. Id. (citing Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 238, 529 N.E.2d at 530).
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pert who refuses or fails to satisfy the discovery obligations of Rule
220(c) is disqualified as a witness.
Rule 220(c) not unreasonably presumes that a litigant who retains an
expert witness has control of that witness and will have the expert's
cooperation in answering and supplementing interrogatories of opposing parties. A party generally does not have that ready access to or
control over treatingphysicians, who, when involved in the litigation,
are involved only because they did form an opinion while treating the
patient which the litigant values as evidence at a trial. To construe
Rule 220 to include treatingphysicians would unrealisticallyand unfairly oblige litigants to ensure that witnesses beyond their control
comply with the extensive discovery obligationsof subsection04
(c) at the
risk of having a witness disqualifiedfor failure to comply.1
Returning to Smith and its statement that "[t]hus the fact that
he testified is not a surprise, rather that he gave an expert opinion
surprised [the] plaintiff,"10 5 it is important to point out that experts are not crucial witnesses who have a specific supreme court
rule governing them simply because they are people with impressive qualifications. Experts are treated differently because they are
the only witnesses who are allowed to testify in the form of opinions. It is the opinion that is the significant portion of the expert's
testimony.
The significance of the opinion is explicitly recognized in Rule
220.
(a)

Definitions.
(1) ...who may be expected to render an opinion ....
(b) Disclosure.
(1) Expert witness ....
(ii) obtain from them the opinions
(c) Discovery.
(1) ***
(ii) his conclusions and opinions ....
(d) Scope of testimony.
To the extent that the facts known or opin06
ions held.'
The committee comments echo the rule's recognition of the importance of the opinion.
Rule 220 attempts to eliminate these evils by establishing a ...framework for the timely revelation of... the subject matter of their testimony ....
104. Tzystuck, 124 Ill. 2d at 237, 529 N.E.2d at 529-30 (emphasis added)(citations omitted). This position was developed in the recent case of
Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants of Missouri, Inc., 223 Ill. App. 3d 31, 584
N.E.2d 963 (5th Dist. 1991), aff'd, No. 73352, 1992 WL 346133 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1992).
But see Taake v. WHGK, Inc., 228 Ill. App 3d 692, 592 N.E.2d 1159 (5th Dist.
1992) (relying on Smith, 176 Ill. App. 3d 482, 531 N.E.2d 51 (4th Dist. 1988)).
105. Smith, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 494-95, 531 N.E.2d at 59.
106. ILL. S.CT. RULE 220 (1984) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220
(1991))(emphasis added).
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The committee is of the opinion that this provides a litigant with ample
time within which to decide whether an opinion is sufficiently
favorable.... In instances where opinions are not sought until a party
approaches an imminent trial, a mandatory and exclusionary cutoff is
provided ....
Paragraph (c)regulates the discovery of an expert's opinions ....
The purpose of the rule is to permit litigants to ascertain
and rely upon
10 7
the opinions of experts retained by their adversaries.
The quotations from the rule and the comments are somewhat
lengthy, but it is essential to establish the importance of opinions in
view of Smith's lighthanded treatment of them. The conclusion
reached in Smith, that "a party, or the employee of a party, who is
intimately involved in the subject matter of the litigation need not
be disclosed as an expert witness," can be criticized on several
levels. First, the exclusion of a party, or a party's employees, from
the ambit of the rule ignores both the language of the rule and the
accompanying comments.10 8 Second, the intimate involvement in
the subject matter of the litigation exception is nowhere mentioned
in Rule 220 or in its comments as a criterion upon which to determine disclosure. To the extent that Smith is relying upon Tzystuck
for this exclusionary principle, it has already been pointed out that
Tzystuck's reference to treatment as the source of the basis for the
doctor's opinion was to establish that the doctor was not retained.
In Smith, the witness was an employee.
If Smith's language is followed, no engineer employed by a
party comes under Rule 220, no accountant employed by a party
comes under Rule 220, and no nurse employed by a party comes
under Rule 220 as long as any of them were intimately involved in
the subject matter of the litigation. The engineer who designed the
widget that is the subject of the suit would not come under Rule
220, and could therefore, change his opinion on the eve of, or during, the trial without fear of any Rule 220 sanctions.
107. Committee Comments, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220(b)-(c)
(Smith-Hurd 1985)(emphasis added).
108. Rule 220 states as follows:
(a) Definitions.
(1) Definition of expert witness. An expert is a person who, because of
education, training or experience, possesses knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the average person on a factual matter material to a claim or defense in pending litigation and who
may be expected to render an opinion within his expertise at trial.
He may be an employee of a party, a party or an independent
contractor.
ILL. S.CT. RuLE 220 (1984) (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220 (1991)).
The committee comments state, "It should be noted that the employees of a
party and an individual party fall within the definition." Committee Comments,
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 220(a) (Smith-Hurd 1984).
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It is submitted by this writer that the Smith extension of Tzystuck is unwarranted. Nevertheless, other courts have followed
Smith in extending Tzystuck. 0 9 The extent of Smith's influence is
exemplified by Jessee v. Amoco Oil Company, 1 0° which actually involved a treating doctor exception, but in which the court stated:
An expert who acquires information because he [is] an actor or viewer
with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject
matter of the lawsuit rather than acquiring information because a lawsuit is contemplated or is pending should be treated as an ordinary witness; thus, Rule 220111
disclosure and discovery provisions do not apply to
treating physicians.

If Jesse had limited its holding to the reiteration of Tzystuck
contained in the concluding clause, it would not require discussion.
Note, however, that the emphasized "should" has moved the intimately involved exception of Smith from a position that "employee" experts "need not be disclosed" to the Jesse position that
they "should" not be disclosed.
12
A fourth district case that follows Smith is Moore v. Roberts"
which involved an injury at a horse race that occurred when a horse
left the track, ran through a closed gate that led to the stables, and
trampled the plaintiff. Three days into the trial, the jockey, Wells,
and the owner, Roberts, settled with the plaintiff, and this left the
Fair Association as the only defendant. To the Association's chagrin, its former co-defendants became expert witnesses for the
plaintiff and testified that the placement of the gate was improper.
The court observed that Roberts had been asked about the gate location in his deposition and had testified that it was not safe. The
opinion did not indicate whether Wells had been asked similar
questions. If he had, and if the court had decided the case on a
harmless error basis, the case would be included under that section
and would be of no further concern. Unfortunately, however, that
was not the basis of the court's decision.
109. See Voyles v. Sanford, 183 Ill. App. 3d 833, 836-37, 539 N.E.2d 801, 803 (3d
Dist. 1989)(trial court reversed based on exclusion of defendant's former employee who had not been disclosed as an expert). Forest Preserve Dist. of
DuPage County v. Brookwood Land Venture, 199 Ill. App. 3d 973, 557 N.E.2d
980 (2d Dist. 1990), allowed three undisclosed experts to testify as "occurrence
witnesses who had direct involvement in the subject matter of the litigation,
and their opinion testimony was not merely prepared in anticipation of trial."
Id. at 981, 557 N.E.2d at 987.
110. 230 Ill. App. 3d 337, 594 N.E.2d 1210 (1st Dist. 1992)(distinguishing between those experts who were privy to information because they were actors
regarding the subject matter of the litigation and those experts who gathered
information in anticipation of the litigation).
111. Id. at 344, 594 N.E.2d at 1215 (emphasis added).
112. 217 Ill. App. 3d 446, 577 N.E.2d 538 (4th Dist. 1991)(ruling that experts
may testify as either occurrence witnesses or expert witnesses).
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[A]lthough Roberts and Wells were not technically parties to this lawsuit, nor were they employees of parties, they were in fact occurrence
witnesses to the subject matter of the litigation. The testimony they
gave was not expert testimony as to the design of the racetrack, but
rather was1 their
opinion based on their experience in training and rid13
ing horses.
While the opinion in Moore does not discuss the possibility of
some arrangement being made between the plaintiff and the two
settling defendants in exchange for their testimony against the sole
remaining defendant, such a possibility has to cross the mind of any
lawyer who has ever tried a case. One can envision, without any
serious stretching of the imagination, similar scenarios in which
doctors who had been co-defendants with a hospital in a medical
malpractice case suddenly appear in the plaintiff's camp. The
supreme court's treating doctor exception might allow this to happen, but it has been the goal of this paper to indicate that the exception should not be extended.
The only case that has been critical of the exception extension
trend is Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurantsof Missouri, Inc.,114 in
which the fifth district took what has been called "a renegade view
of Rule 220 disclosure requirements." 115 The court determined that
the identity of all experts must be disclosed pursuant to Rule 220.
The court further classified experts into two groups: those retained
for litigation and those not retained. Experts retained for litigation
are subject to the normal strictures of the Rule. But Rule 220's
treatment of nonretained experts, according to the court, requires a
different procedure. Where nonretained experts were involved, the
opposing party would be permitted to seek "whatever discovery it
16
deem[ed] appropriate once disclosure [was] made."'
The practical effect of the Wakeford decision at the appellate
level (Wakeford 1) can be viewed in two ways. The first view holds
that Wakeford I created an exception to the multiplicity of exceptions that began with Tzystuck. The second view holds that Wakeford I recognized an additional class of experts which are different
from the retained or consulting experts that are the primary focus
of Rule 220.
If the first view is accepted, then Wakeford I is subject to Mr.
Redden's criticism that:
113. Id. at 454, 577 N.E.2d at 543.
114. 223 Ill. App. 3d 31, 584 N.E.2d 963 (5th Dist. 1991), aff'd, No. 73352, 1992
WL 356133 (Dec. 4, 1992).
115. James R. Williams, Survey of Illinois Law: Civil Procedure,16 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 807, 824 (1992). Williams notes that the suggestions contained in the appellate court's Wakeford decision may prove to be a precursor for needed change
to correct the problems lawyers face in their attempts to comply correctly with
Rule 220 disclosure requirements. Id. at 826.
116. Wakeford, 223 Ill. App. 3d at 40, 584 N.E.2d at 969.
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The Wakeford court chose - remarkably - to find an exception to
the exception. Rather than simply characterize the officer as an expert under Rule 220(a)(1), the Wakeford court noted that the witness'
involvement in the case went beyond that of an occurrence witness and
he became, therefore, an expert witness within the meaning of the
117
rule.
In response to Mr. Redden's criticism on this point, two matters
should be noted. First, the quoted criticism is muted somewhat by
his following paragraph:
Regardless, the Wakeford court must be credited for rejecting the notion that a label such as "treating physician" or "occurrence witness"
unconditionally exempts an expert from the dictates of Rule 220. In its
wisdom, the court in Wakeford found significant the nature and development of
the opinion testimony and their relationship to the
11 s
litigation.
Further, the appellate court in Wakeford I was not writing upon a
clean slate. Tzystuck is a supreme court decision. It began the exception trend. The appellate court is not the source of judicial policy in the state.119
The second possible view of Wakeford I is the preferable one:
there are experts, as that term is defined in Rule 220, whose identity should be disclosed even though the rest of the Rule 220 requirements should not be imposed on their proponents.
Mr.
Redden's criticism and the author's personal views notwithstanding, on December 10, 1992, the supreme court resolved the issue in a
somewhat different manner in Wakeford v. Rodehouse Restaurants
of Missouri, Inc. (Wakeford II).120
Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated:
We agree with our appellate court that the question of whether a witness must be disclosed as an expert under Rule 220 depends on the
expert's relationship to the case. If the expert is intimately involved in
the underlying facts giving rise to the litigation and he would reasonably be expected to form an opinion through that involvement, then
disclosure is not required. In such a case, the opposing party is unlikely to be surprised by the testimony. On the other hand, where the
expert's contact with the case is slight, or where the opinion rendered
is unrelated
to the expert's involvement in the case, then disclosure is
12 1
required.
117. Redden, supra note 30, at 445.
118. Id.
119. People v. Layhew, 139 Ill. 2d 476, 489, 564 N.E.2d 1232, 1238 (1990)(reminding the appellate court in the fifth district that "there is but one appellate
court within the State of Illinois, and that a panel of the appellate court does
not have constitutional authority to issue 'directives' to lower courts within its
district").
120. No. 73352, 1992 WL 356133 (Ill. Dec. 4, 1992).
121. Id. at * 3.
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As a judge who prefers being affirmed to being reversed as
much as any other judge, and with all due respect to the supreme
court, there are problems with the rationale of the majority opinion. In the first sentence of the quote, the supreme court did not
adopt the appellate court's distinction that required the identity of
all expert witnesses to be disclosed while relieving the proponent of
the non-retained expert from the burden of the other provisions of
Rule 220. Instead, the supreme court treats disclosure as a term
that encompasses all the elements of Rule 220. With that treatment
of the terms in mind, the supreme court then correctly states that
the necessity of disclosure depends on the expert's relationship to
the case. It is submitted, however, that interpretation of the next
sentence of Wakeford II may present problems in the future.
Breaking the sentence down into its components, the clause,
"[i]f the expert is intimately involved in the underlying facts giving
rise to the litigation," is no more than the Smith "intimately involved with the subject matter of the litigation" test, and is subject
to the same criticisms. 122 The second portion of the sentence, "and
he would reasonably be expected to form an opinion through that
involvement, then disclosure is not required," presents a different
sort of problem. The potential problem with the second portion of
the Wakeford II test is its lack of certainty in several areas. First,
how often and when will an expert reasonably be expected to form
an opinion that is relevant to the issues at trial and that arises from
the expert's intimate involvement with the underlying facts? Second, who is to make the determination of whether the expert would
"reasonably be expected to form an opinion" at trial? Is it to be the
proponent of the expert, or is the burden of making this determination to fall upon the opponent?
While Rule 220 properly recognizes that the proponent of the
expert generally has superior knowledge of the witness' opinions
and requires the proponent to disclose, Wakeford II may shift this
burden. Immediately after the "reasonably expected" language, the
court states that, "[i]n such a case, the opposing party is unlikely to
be surprised by the testimony." This sentence might lead some
readers to conclude that the opponent must make the determination. For example, Justice Heiple criticized the majority and focused upon the second portion in his vituperative dissent:
[NIever mind that any attorney worth his salt would have anticipated
that defendant would call the officer who investigated the shooting and
would dispute the claim that security guards were necessary ....
Therefore, a witness that an opposing party should reasonably expect
to be called will probably not fall within the disclosure compelled by
122. See supra notes 100-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Smith exception.
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Rule 220.123

Thus, whether the majority in Wakeford II meant to shift the
burden of determining whether an expert opinion would be offered,
at least one member of the supreme court has implied that it did.
More important than the opinion of the sole dissenting member is
another statement in the majority opinion. "The opinion [on the
need for a security guard] is not related to the investigation of the
crime that a party could reasonably anticipate that Lahlien would
1 24
testify on the matter."'
Again, with all due respect to the majority and the minority
opinions, the ability of a party to guess, infer, divine, or otherwise
determine that the opponent will call a witness to offer an opinion
should have little, if anything, to do with the duty of the proponent
to disclose the expert's identity. Whether the opposing party could
have, might have, or should have known of the identity or even the
opinion of the witness is an element to consider in determining
whether the opponent was improperly surprised or prejudiced by
the use of the witness. The purpose of Rule 220, however, was to
move the inquiry backward in time so that the question of surprise
or prejudice does not arise. If the identities of all experts were disclosed under the Wakeford I analysis, and the identity, qualifications, and opinions of retained experts were disclosed under Rule
220, then the need to "anticipate" and the relative skills of lawyers
would no longer consume inordinate amounts of judicial time in
resolving these questions.
In a case decided between Wakeford I and Wakeford II, the
fifth district appellate court again refused to expand the exceptions
to Rule 220. In Thompson v. Illinois Power Company 125 the court
reversed a $1.6 million verdict. In Thompson, there was little discussion of the expert issue beyond a reference to Wakeford I and
the following warning:
Counsel contemplating whether to provide their opponents with
the names of experts would be well advised to heed Robert Frost's admonition to,

"The witch that came (the withered hag)
to wash the steps with pail and rag,
was once the beauty, Abishag."
Frost titled the poem and closed it with the same warning, "Provide,
126
provide!"'
123. Wakeford, 1992 WL 356133, at *4, 5.
124. Id. at *3.
125. 237 Ill. App. 3d 273, 603 N.E.2d 1303 (5th Dist. 1992).
126. Id. at 1307 (citing DAVID A. SOHN AND RICHARD W. TYRE, FROST: THE
POET AND His POETRY 112 (1969)).
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CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the exceptions to disclosure that have
been created in the four years since Tzystuck, and it has been critical of most of them. No criticism has been leveled at the supreme
court's decision in Tzystuck itself for two reasons. First, this paper
was originally presented to Illinois judges who are bound to follow
the decisions of the supreme court. Second, there is a legitimate
distinction, in terms of control, between retained and non-retained
experts. This distinction, however, does not require an extension of
Tzystuck's exceptions into thirteen or fourteen additional categories
to accommodate late disclosure of either the identities or the opinions of expert witnesses. The words of Justice Ryan are as applicable in the civil area as they are in the criminal area,
At the risk of stating the obvious, it should be pointed out that the

rules adopted by this court concerning criminal defendants and guilty
pleas are in fact rules of procedure and not suggestions.
It is incum127
bent upon counsel and courts alike to follow them.

127. People v. Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d 93, 103, 529 N.E.2d 218, 221 (1988)(emphasis
added).

